Last modified: Mon 12/21/2023

Gender Identity: A Philosophical Challenge 

The transgender movement has created considerable scientific interest, as well as political and cultural division. Instead of yielding all insight to scientific inquiry, it is crucial that philosophical analysis contributes to the academic conversation and addresses the philosophical elements of transgenderism. This paper will explore gender identity, a fundamental concept within transgenderism, and its philosophical underpinnings. Further treatment will be given to the contrasting views of essentialist and constructivist views of gender and how they interact with the philosophy of the mind. Of particular focus is the post-modernist constructivist stance defended by philosopher Judith Butler, who argues that gender is “performative” and a culturally influenced construct. However, this philosophical inquiry's intent is not to show gender identity as false but at least ambiguous and needing clarification.  

Defining Our Terms: Dualism

To begin, it is important to properly define what is meant by dualism, transgenderism, and gender identity, especially for those who are unfamiliar.  "In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical—or mind and body or mind and brain—are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing" (Robinson).  This is particularly true for substance dualism—or Cartesian dualism—which affirms that the mind and body are separate and distinct substances.  Substance dualism also seems to be the sort of dualism implied within the concept of “gender identity”.  According to the dualist—as well as the common-sense understanding—the brain is part of the physical or material reality whose neurons communicate with each other through synapses and control the functions of the body through action potential transmissions.  In contrast, the mind or soul, as understood strictly from the dualist perspective, is part of a non-physical or immaterial reality and makes up the features of human consciousness, which includes properties like sensations, thoughts, beliefs, desires, and freedom of the will. The dualist distinction is drawn from Leibniz's Law of Identity, "according to which two things are identical if, and only if, they simultaneously share exactly the same qualities" (Calef).  Therefore, it is the dualist’s claim that the mind and body are not identical and that they do, in fact, have different qualities.

Defining Our Terms: Transgenderism

Regarding the understanding of transgenderism, the American Psychological Association explains that transgenderism, also referred to as Gender Dysphoria, should be understood as "an umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or expression is different from cultural expectations based on the sex they were assigned at birth".   For instance, though a person might have all of the physical characteristics of a male, their gender identity might reflect a female and vice versa.  Transgenderism also comes in two prevailing models: the "wrong-body" model and the "beyond-the-binary" model.  The "wrong-body" model also comes in two versions: the weak version and the strong version.  The weak version claims that, after gender reassignment surgery, one actually becomes a man or woman.  The strong version claims that, on the basis of one's gender identity, one has always been the man or woman they claim to be.  "In both versions, one is effectively a man or woman 'trapped in the wrong body'" (Bettcher 383).  The "beyond-the-binary" model is not much different than the "wrong-body" model.  The only difference is that the “beyond-the-binary” model rejects the binary distinctions of the "wrong-body" model; preferring, instead, a spectrum of gender identities, which has accumulated to over 100 different possible genders, but it's commonly acknowledged that the possibilities are infinite.

Defining Our Terms: Gender Identity

It is especially important to understand what one means by "gender identity."  According to the popular-level understanding, gender identity is a "person’s innermost concept of self as man, woman, a blend of both, or neither – how individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves". Medical professionals state that gender identity "refers to a person's internal sense of being male, female or something else...".  Trans-activists define gender identity as a person's "one's own internal sense of self and their gender, whether that is man, woman, neither or both."  It is precisely this ambiguous definition of "gender identity" that prompts curiosity, confusion, and, thus, a philosophical inquiry.

A Dualist Claim:

To elaborate on the ambiguity of the term "gender identity," it is helpful to phrase it in the form of a question: when a person refers to their "innermost concept of self," their "internal sense of being male, female, or something else," their "inner experience of gender," what exactly are they referring to?  What exactly is this internal sense that is affirmed over and over in the concept of gender identity?  There is no explicit answer.  In fact, by all accounts, it seems the question has never even been raised.  However, there is an implicit philosophical answer: they are referring to something distinct from their physical body (i.e., dualism).  Leibniz's Law of Identity claims that "x is identical to y if, and only if, for any property p had by x at time t, y also has p at t, and vice versa" (Calef 3a).  In the case of transgenderism and by their own admission, the claim is that the external body is different from the internal self.  So, when x is not identical to y, you have a dualist distinction of mind/soul and body (i.e., the mind is distinct and different from the brain).  Therefore, when pop culture, medical professionals, and activists refer to this idea of an internal sense of self that is different from the external appearance of self, an inference to the best explanation is that they are referring to a dualistic concept of body and self, wherein the internal person is different from the external person.  In other words, this internal sense seems to be referring to the mind or soul of the person.  This inference seems to be reaffirmed in the claim that a transgender person is "born in the wrong body" or "one is effectively a man or woman 'trapped in the wrong body'" (Bettcher 383).  Advocates attempt to justify this sort of reasoning by pointing to other cultures that affirm non-binary forms of gender identities.  For instance, some pre-Columbian tribes often had more than two gender roles, and those that belonged to a gender outside of the typical binary are often referred to as "two-spirited" people (Hunt 7).  Of course, it is fallacious to point to another culture for justification of a position without also substantiating the truth of that culture's claim.  Nonetheless, it seems safe to infer that proponents who affirm the aforementioned understanding of “gender identity” are, perhaps unknowingly, making a philosophical claim about the nature of the mind and the body, and that claim seems to affirm substance dualism.

Naïve Dualism: A Category Mistake

A naïve understanding of dualism might lead one to believe that there simply is no problem with a person asserting that their "inner experience of gender" is different than their external physical appearance.  After all, dualism does affirm a radical difference between mind/soul and body.  However, the naïve dualist is likely conceiving of their “internal self” as something like the "two-spirit" people or perhaps something like you would see in the movie Ghost, where Patrick Swayze, after being murdered, has left his physical body and all that remains is his spirit.  Of course, Swayze, even in his spirited form, is male and clothed with what he died in.  Although this sort of naïve dualism makes for an emotional and romantic movie, it is a view that is philosophically problematic.  Although dualism does indeed affirm that there is a radical distinction between mind and body, the mind is understood as an immaterial reality. What this means is that a key failure of gender identity is in applying material characteristics (i.e., maleness and femaleness) to an immaterial reality (i.e., the mind or soul).  Transgender patients and advocates are committing the logical fallacy of a category mistake, which is "a mistake in which something is said to have a particular quality, or be able to do a particular thing, that only members of another category of things can have or do". For example, treating abstract objects as though they had a physical shape or location would be a category mistake. As a result, the gender identity claim becomes logically unintelligible for the fact that the mind, a non-physical reality, has no gendered properties of maleness or femaleness. 

This conclusion is most obviously applicable to the "wrong-body" model of transgenderism, which asserts the idea that a man or woman is, quite literally, trapped in the wrong body.  It is philosophical nonsense to suggest that one's mind is a man/woman or male/female.  Male and female gender distinctions seem to only be relevant in a physically materialistic way.  That is to say, the person's sex or physical appearance (i.e., genitalia, muscular & skeletal structure), their biological data, and their unique function for reproduction and propagating DNA, when functioning properly, will almost always indicate that person's gender. The mind simply has no physical material and, since there is no DNA to propagate, has no need for gender distinctions. What possible role would a gendered mind or soul have within an immaterial reality? The "beyond-the-binary" model is less obviously affected by this objection since it makes no claim to a specific gender—rather, to a plurality of genders.  Nevertheless, there is no reason to apply any sort of gender characteristics to the mind or soul.

Stereotypes vs Archetypes:

An objection might be raised that, given that the functions of the mind are thinking, beliefs, desires, and sensations then a transgender person simply has the sensations and thoughts of a gender that is not congruent with their sex at birth and, therefore, they believe and desire to be the gender they most closely relate with. It’s important that I emphasize that I believe a transgender person when they say that they truly are experiencing discomfort, distress, and incongruence with their body. I have no doubt that gender dysphoria is a genuine psychological condition. My contention is with the truth claim that gender identity actually determines whether someone is a man or woman. I reject that claim for a few reasons. First, the idea of feeling and/or thinking like a gender that is not your own seems to suffer from Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box problem with no hope of being solved. Next, what it even means to think or feel like a man or a woman is far from clear. It is easy to understand what it feels like to have warmth on your skin, a headache, being in love, etc. These sensations are likely similarly shared between men and women given the strong analogistic structure of our brains and our five senses. It is also easy to understand what it means to think about something and to think like, say, a Christian (e.g., reflecting on biblical precepts). In fact, it is easy to understand what it means to “put yourself in someone's shoes” when trying to empathize with a person’s experience. But it seems difficult, if not impossible, to understand what it means to feel or think like a man or a woman without devolving into gender stereotypes. This fact is my point of contention with the philosopher Judith Butler and her view of gender, which is that it is determined by performative functions and cultural determinations, not biological ones. 

Judith Butler on Gender:

Butler argues that one's gender is determined "through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one's hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being". A point worth noting here is that Butler's use of the term "gender-coded" is a clever semantic sleight of hand.  "Gender-coded" is simply a more socially acceptable way of saying "gender-stereotype". As a result of Butler’s argument, one could appeal to “being trans” on the basis of offensive “gender-coded” behavior. For instance, what if one was to claim to be a trans-woman on the basis that they take two hours to fix their hair, they find themselves doing the laundry and dishes regularly, they are emotionally unstable, a terrible driver, and they just love to gossip? These are all performative gender-coded behaviors. Yet, one would be justified in rejecting my claim of being a "trans-woman" on the grounds that my definition of being a woman is based on mere gender stereotypes.  Likewise, we would be justified in rejecting Judith Butler's examples of "gender-coded" behaviors, which are also mere gender stereotypes.  Matt Walsh, a political pundit, once commented that trans-women are "appropriating womanhood by turning it into a costume that you can wear".  He is absolutely correct.  The trans community appropriates womanhood and manhood by adopting and mimicking the gender stereotypes of men and women in a particular culture, creating a caricature of the real thing.  If gender distinctions are, as Butler admits, simply "a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being", then it is nothing more than gender-LARPing or "woman-face" and can be reduced to the most offensive of stereotypes, akin to the Dylan Mulvaney's of the world. 

Conclusion:

One may be tempted to reject or dismiss dualism as an element of gender identity, but a rejection of dualism only complicates the matter more. If dualism is false, then the notion of gender identity becomes doubly ambiguous; for what could one's internal self possibly be referring to if there is no internal self there? If dualism is true, then the original dualist conclusion stands. That is, it is fallacious to try to apply material characteristics to an immaterial reality, to do so would be a category mistake. Nevertheless, it does seem to be the case that transgenderism makes what could be considered a naïve dualistic claim. However, the transgender conception of dualism is misconceived and incoherent. Furthermore, there are no good reasons to suggest that specific thoughts, beliefs, desires, or sensations would have gendered properties without descending into gender stereotypes. Judith Butler's constructivist notion of “gender-coded” behavior, then, fails to establish sufficient reasons for believing such behavior is adequate for gender and sex distinctions. Therefore, given the philosophical challenges of gender identity, the concept is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, incoherent, rendering it a social construct without any rational basis.